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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah ;
Corporation,
]
Plaintiff/Appellee,

]

vs.

]
\
MARMALADE SQUARE
;
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS ;
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation,;
BRUCE MANKA and FRANK
;
GUYMAN
]

Court of Appeals No. 20090166

Defendants/Appellants. )
The Appellants, as allowed by Utah R. App. P. 24, submit the following
Reply Brief in support of their position in this matter.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE APPELLANTS RELY
ARE UNDISPUTED
The Appellants, in their opening brief, set out all of the facts that relate to
this case in order to provide the Court with background and context. However,
there are only a few core facts that form the basis of the Appellants' request for
relief in this case; and, the Appellee has conceded or failed to respond to them all.
Appellants submit that the following uncontested facts establish that the trial court
committed reversible error in granting the Plaintiffs motion to set aside its default
1

after the Appellee and its lawyer failed to appear for the scheduled trial in the
matter.
1.

On July 8, 2008, the district court set this matter for pretrial on
July 22, 2008 (R. 325-26).

At the time of the Pretrial

Conference, the case was set for a bench trial on October 14,
2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 328). However, the Notice of Bench Trial
that was sent to counsel by the trial court, on July 22, 2008, set
the trial date for November 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 333-335).
The Court docket reflects that on July 25, 2008, the Court sent a
Corrected Notice of Bench Trial to counsel changing the trial
date back to October 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m., the date established
at the time of the Pretrial Conference (R. 337-39, Appellee's
Brief, pp. 2-3).
2.

On July 29, 2008, as a result of a conference call with the Court
and both counsel, the trial date was changed to October 28,
2008, at 9:30 a.m., a date and time accepted by both counsel. A
Notice of Rescheduled Bench Trial was then sent to counsel on
that same day, July 29, 2008 (R. 340-41). The Notice setting
the matter for trial on October 28, 2008, was sent to the correct
addresses for counsel and explicitly provided therein that
2

nonappearance at trial could result in the entry of default of the
non-appearing party. Id. It is undisputed that the conference
call occurred; that a mutually acceptable date was set for trial;
and, that an appropriate notice of trial was sent by the court and
received by counsel (R. 340-41, Appellee's Brief does not
dispute the facts).
3.

On

the

morning

of

trial,

October

28,

Defendants/Appellants with counsel appeared.

2008,

the

The Plaintiff

and its counsel did not. Judge Faust waited fifteen minutes after
the time set for trial, 9:30 a.m., and still, the Plaintiff and its
counsel did not appear. The trial court then authorized the entry
of the Plaintiffs default and awarded the Defendants their
attorney fees (R. 366, Appellee's Brief does not dispute the
fact).
4.

Because of the erroneous entry by the clerk registering the
Defendants' default instead of the Plaintiff, counsel for the
Defendants/Appellants

immediately

filed

a motion with

supporting memorandum and affidavit to correct the erroneous
entry of Defendants' default and authorize the entry of the
Plaintiffs default. The motion with supporting memorandum
3

and affidavit was filed on October 30, 2008 (R. 367-71, 374-83,
Addendum).
5.

The Plaintiff/Appellee filed, on November 3, 2008, a two-page
unverified motion to set aside the Plaintiffs default (R. 372373). The Defendants/Appellants filed a memorandum in
opposition to the Plaintiff/Appellee's motion to set aside the
default (R. 384-89). The Plaintiff did not file a memorandum in
support of its motion to set aside the default or in opposition to
the Defendants motion to correct the default. Neither a verified
pleading nor affidavit was prepared or submitted in support of
Plaintiffs motion or in opposition to Defendants' motions.
(Appellee's Brief does not dispute the facts).

6.

On December 22, 2008, Judge Faust signed the Order
Correcting Entry of Default, prepared by counsel for the
Defendants (R. 398-399). In relevant part, the Order stated:
The Court hereby relieves the Defendant from the default
entered on October 28, 2008 against the Defendants.
The Court hereby enters the default of the Plaintiff, who
failed to appear for trial on October 28, 2008.

4

7.

Then on February 4, 2009, Judge Faust, without any evidentiary
basis other than the unverified two-page motion of Plaintiffs
counsel, signed a Minute Entry that provided:
This case came before the court for consideration of
Defendant's Motion for Correction of Entry of Default
and Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default and Set New
Trial Date. After review of the file and pleadings therein,
the court rules that the default of any party previously
entered is hereby set aside. The clerk is directed to set
this case for a Pretrial Conference, so that settlement
discussions may be affected and/or a mutually acceptable
date for a Bench Trial may be set. This minute entry is
the order of the court on this issue; no further order is
required (R. 400).

POINT II: PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVIDE A FACTUAL BASIS
UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION.
The Plaintiff/Appellee filed a simple two-page motion to set aside the
default authorized by the trial court (R. 372-373). The motion was not verified and
no affidavit of either counsel for the Plaintiff or a representative of the Plaintiff
accompanied the motion. The motion, in contravention of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b) (1)
was unaccompanied by a memorandum. In the Motion, counsel for the Plaintiff
asserted that he believed the trial date was November 14, 2008 instead of October
28, 2008. Id. However, counsel for the Plaintiff, in his motion, did not deny that
he was privy to the conference call with the court and other counsel on July 29,
2008, setting the October 28, 2008 trial date. Further Plaintiffs counsel did not
5

deny receiving the Notice of Rescheduled Bench Trial, setting the October 28,
2008 trial date (R. 340).
In the Affidavit submitted by counsel for Defendants/Appellants, counsel for
the Defendants very carefully, under oath, recited the events that had resulted in
the setting of the October 28 trial date, the events that transpired on the day of trial
including the time that the trial court and counsel waited for the Plaintiff and the
eventual order of the trial court for entiy of default and authorizing of attorney fees
(R. 374-81).

In addition, the Defendants/Appellants filed a memorandum in

opposition to the Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default authorized by the trial
court (R. 364-89). In the memorandum the Defendants/Appellants explicitly
outlined all the deficiencies of the Plaintiffs motion. Id. Plaintiff did not file, in
response to the Defendants' memorandum and affidavit, any additional pleading
supplementing its motion, such as a memorandum addressing the legal basis and
adequacy of the Plaintiffs motion, an affidavit attesting to the factual basis of the
motion, or any other evidence to support the motion.
An unverified pleading is simply not evidence. The best example of the
process that should have been utilized in this case is the procedure utilized in
summary judgment proceedings. While a party may start out contesting a motion
by relying on the bare allegations in a pleading, once the moving party has
established the non-existence of a justicable fact, a party disputing a summary
6

judgment motion has the burden of disputing the motion with material facts. See
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). An adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by
affidavit or other verified evidence, must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.
Any such affidavit submitted must set forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). See Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P.2d
769 (1969). In this case, the Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default was entirely
conclusory and without any factual support or foundation. The pleading recites
only that, "[t]he Plaintiff believed the trial was set for November 14, 2008." The
pleading continues that the changing of the trial dates caused confusion.

In

summary judgment proceedings, the law is clear that u[t]he allegations of a
pleading or factual conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine
issue of fact." Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858 (Utah
2008) (citations omitted).
The motion filed by the Plaintiff in this case simply presented no facts upon
which the trial court could have exercised its discretion. Utah R. Civ. P. 43(b)
states:
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits
7

presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that
the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions. (Emphasis added)
Id.
The bare allegation that the Plaintiff thought the trial was on another day is
simply insufficient as a matter of law to even create a Rule 60(b) issue. Certainly,
after the Defendants/Appellants supplied a memorandum in opposition to the
Plaintiffs motion and an Affidavit carefully setting out how the trial date was
arrived at and noticed by the Court, the bare allegation of the Plaintiff did not
create a justicable issue of fact (R. 374-81).
Appellants respectfully submit that in order to provide a court with a factual
basis upon which to exercise Rule 60(b) discretion, a party must submit evidence
of the facts upon which the motion is based. The bare conclusions of a pleading are
insufficient as a matter of law.
In this case, Plaintiff did not even attempt in its unverified pleading to
outline the underlying facts upon which the confusion in the trial date was based.
Certainly, Appellee is not suggesting that in every case where a trial date has been
changed, a party is excused from appearing. Appellee must certainly recognize
that there has to be more to a claim of excusable neglect than the existence of
changes in the trial date. Yet, the only conclusion provided in Appellee's motion

8

to set aside that confusion was created by the change in the trial date and that
counsel thought trial was on another day.
What is missing, even within the barren conclusory motion the Plaintiff
filed, is an explanation as to why there was confusion. If counsel sent the notice of
trial to his client, how could both of them have been confused as to the trial date?
If counsel has any kind of basic calendaring system, wasn't the correct date
inserted by him in the calendar when he cleared the day for the court in the
conference call? Wasn't a secretary or the lawyer himself responsible to calendar
trial notices that came in by mail?
Defendants/Appellants submit that the motion of the Plaintiff/Appellee
simply did not provide any admissible facts upon which the trial court could have
exercised its discretion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
POINT III: THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH
"DUE DILIGENCE" UNDER RULE 60(b)
There is no dispute that Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a court to set aside a default judgment upon the demonstration by the
moving party of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The
Appellee does not discuss and therefore does not dispute the three components of a
Rule 60(b) showing. First, the motion must be made hall be made within three

9

months after the judgment was entered or taken. There is no dispute that the
Plaintiffs motion was timely filed.
Second, the case law requires that a basis for the relief has been established
under the Rule. Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664 (Utah App. 2004); Black's
Title, Inc., 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999); and Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah
2000). Appellant does not dispute that the Plaintiffs pleadings established a prima
facie case.
Third and critically, however, the case law is clear that "[t]o demonstrate
that the default was due to excusable neglect, f[t]he movant must show that he has
used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances
over which he had no control/" Black's Title, Inc., supra, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App.
1999) (quoting Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429,
431 (1973)) (alteration in original).

The Utah Supreme Court has defined

"excusable neglect" as "the exercise of 'due diligence1 by a reasonably prudent
person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733
P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (citing Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah
2d 65, 513 P.2d 429,431 (1973)).

10

The standard for "due diligence" and "excusable neglect" urged by the
Appellant and not contested by the Appellee is set out in Interstate Excavating v.
AglaDev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980):
This Court has previously stated that neglect, to be excusable, must
occur despite the exercise of due diligence. Airkem Intermountain,
Inc. v. Parker, supra, footnote 5. Other jurisdictions have defined
excusable neglect as "such as might have been the act of a reasonably
prudent person under the same circumstances." Kromm v. Kromm,
191 P.2d 115 (Cal App. 1948). It has also been held that simple
carelessness does not rise to the statutory standard, Doyle v. Rice
Ranch Oil Co., 81 P.2d 980 (Cal App. 1938), nor do simple business
difficulties which allegedly prevent the dedication of adequate
attention to the litigation in question. Usery v. Weiner Bros., Inc., 70
F.R.D. 615 (D.C. 1976). Moreover, this Court has held that the failure
of a party to appear in court, allegedly occasioned by failure of notice
due to withdrawal of counsel, does not constitute such "excusable
neglect" as to justify relief from judgment.... [citing case].
Id.
In its brief, Appellee again simply cites to the fact that the trial date in this
case was reset a total of three times. Appellee then assumes that because the trial
date was reset on more than one occasion, that the law only requires, in order to
avoid a default judgment, that counsel for the party claim that he thought the trial
was on another day (Appellee's Brief, pp. 14-15). Somehow, Appellee seems to
argue, the existence of rescheduled trial dates, motion hearings, depositions, and
the like, not only open the door to the excusable nonappearance of lawyers and
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their clients; but also, provides conclusive evidence to support a legal
determination of excusable neglect and due diligence.
Appellant respectfully disagrees with the argument of Appellee. The
rescheduling of every facet of the legal practice is, in fact, the norm. Every lawyer
experiences regularly the rescheduling of meetings with clients, other lawyers,
depositions, motion hearings and trial dates. A lawyer who is not equipped to
handle all aspects of an ever-changing calendar would not fare well in the practice
of law. The lawyer is not only required to keep track of his calendar for himself
but also for his client. Clearly, there is no case law that excuses a lawyer from trial
simply because the setting has been the subject of a prior continuance or date
change.
The Appellant submits that if this Court agrees with the analysis provided in
the previous paragraph, the Appellant is entitled to the relief requested on appeal.
The Appellee, both in its motion to set aside and in its brief filed with this court,
fails and refuses to go beyond the claim that the change in the trial date caused
confusion and that the confusion resulted in the nonappearance at trial.
Appellant submits that the case law clearly requires something more. The
case law requires a factual basis for the legal conclusion that the party and his
lawyer exercised "due diligence."
12

The facts in this case establish that the trial was set, at the time of pretrial
(July 22, 2008), for October 14, 2008, However, the Notice of Bench Trial that
was sent to counsel listed the trial date as November 14, 2008. Then on July 25,
2008, the Court sent a Corrected Notice of Bench Trial to counsel changing the
trial date back to October 14, 2008. On July 29, 2008, as a result of a conference
call with the Court, the trial date was changed to October 28, 2008, and a notice, so
stating was sent and received by counsel.
The looming question in this case is how could counsel for the Plaintiff have
been confused as to the trial date and how could that confusion have caused him to
miss trial on October 28. Both the original and amended trial setting were for
October 14—two weeks before the actual trial. If counsel was confused, why
didn't he appear on October 14 for trial and then discover the correct trial date?
To accept that counsel for the Plaintiff was confused, one would have to
conclude that from the pretrial conference, the multiple notices and the conference
call with the court, the only date that the Plaintiff entered on his calendar was
November 14 (which is the only date that followed the actual trial). It is beyond
the scope of reasonability to believe that the November 14 day was calendared and
the multiple notices and conference call leading to the October 14 and October 28
dates were not. Appellant simply cannot fashion a plausible explanation that
13

comports with the Appellee's explanation. If counsel has appeared at court on
October 14 (the setting twice the subject of court notices), he would have learned
the correct date upon inquiry. There is simply no logical explanation how the
Plaintiff could have extracted the November 14 date out of the facts in this case
and disregarded the remainder of the notices and the content of the conference call
that set trial on October 28.
Appellant therefore submits that the Plaintiff could not show facts to
demonstrate any confusion as to the trial date, if any degree of care was exercised.
The case law, however, requires more that a showing that a party was
confused.

Certainly, the law requires a showing of the procedures in place to

receive and calendar court notices.

The law requires some showing of the

procedure used when clearing a date with the court and counsel. The law would
then require some showing that the notices of trial were forwarded to the client and
dates were set to prepare for trial.

Only after a demonstration of the components

listed above that would evidence "due diligence" would a party be allowed to show
that in spite of those measures, attendance at trial was precluded by circumstances
beyond the control of the client and the lawyer.
Because the Appellee has completely failed to refute the standard for Rule
60(b) relief and failed to demonstrate any facts provided to the district court that
14

would allow the court to exercise its discretion, the decision to set aside the default
was error. Appellant submits that the district court was precluded from exercising
its discretion because of the total absence of any facts that could constitute
excusable neglect, mistake and due diligence.

Further, that the explanation

provided by the Plaintiff does not, as a matter of law, constitute excusable neglect
and due diligence.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
There is no dispute with regard to the requirement that a trial court, in
exercising its discretion under Rule 60(b), must make adequate findings of fact to
support the decision. Hunt v. Hunt, 2004 UT App 2 (Ut Ct. App. 2004); Lund v.
Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000) (per curiam); May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109,
1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)). In Davis v. Goldsworthy, 184 P.3d 626 (Ut. Ct.
App. 2008), the Court stated that while a trial court has considerable discretion
with regard to Rule 60, "[a] decision premised on flawed legal conclusions . . .
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Lund, supra.
The Appellee does not contest that there were no specific findings of fact
accompanying the Minute Entry of February 4, 2009 relieving the Plaintiff from
the default judgment (R. 400-401). Appellee argues, instead, that the inclusion of
the phrase, "[a]fter review of the file and pleadings herein, the court rules that the
15

default of any party previously entered is hereby set aside . . . " satisfies the
requirement of adequate findings of fact (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-10).

Appellant

submits that the phrase cited above does not satisfy the requirement for specific
findings that would advise the parties and this Court of the rationale and mental
process employed by the trial judge in rendering the decision.
The Court in Lund was clear. A district court's ruling on a motion to set
aside a default judgment "must be based on adequate findings of fact and on the
law." Id. P 9 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The appellate court
reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review.
Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, P 1 n.l, 123 P.3d 416. The Court reviews a district
court's conclusions of law for correctness, affording the trial court no deference.
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(reviewing district court's conclusions of law in context of a 60(b) motion for
correctness). If a district court's ruling on a 60(b) motion is based on clearly
erroneous factual findings or flawed legal conclusions, the district court has likely
abused its discretion. See Lund, 11 P.3d 277.
Appellant submits that there were no findings of fact and conclusions of law
that would satisfy the standard imposed by the Utah Appellate Courts.
More importantly however, the Appellants contend as set out in the earlier
points of this Reply Brief, that there was no evidence, either in the Pleadings or
16

provided by the Plaintiff, that would allow the trial court to enter legally sufficient
findings and conclusions relieving the Plaintiff of the default judgment. Appellants
contend that the Plaintiffs motion for relief is defective, as a matter of law, and
therefore, the district court could not have fashioned acceptable findings and
conclusions to support a decision to set aside the default because the lack of a
factual basis in the Plaintiffs motion or in the case, generally.
POINT V: THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS INCLUDING FEES INCURRED ON
APPEAL
If this Court reverses the Trial Court's Minute Entry, the default of the
Plaintiff will be reinstated and the litigation will be concluded with the exception
of the issue of attorney fees. At the time set for trial in this case, the trial court, in
addition to authorizing the default of the Plaintiff, also authorized the award of
attorney fees {See R. 391-395, 375 (para.13)).

The Defendants submitted an

affidavit detailing the attorney fees incurred in the litigation; however, because the
trial court set aside the default, the district court did not enter a judgment for
attorney fees and costs.
The Defendants have requested from this Court an order reversing the trial
court's decision to set aside the Plaintiffs default and an additional order
instructing the district court, on remand, to enter judgment, in favor of Defendants,
for reasonably incurred attorney fees and costs both at the trial level and on appeal.
17

See generally Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) ([W]hen a
party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled
to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The basis of the Defendants/Appellants claim for attorney fees is straight
forward. It is based on the provision contained in the contract that forms the basis
of the Plaintiffs claim in this case and attached to the original complaint and the
amendments thereto.

It is also contained in the exhibits that the Plaintiff

designated to be introduced at trial (R. 2, para.8; 189, para. 10). Defendants have,
throughout the litigation claimed attorney fees based upon that language contained
in the contract and the statutory provisions relating to (R. 64-65, Seventh Defense).
Utah Code Annotated 78B-5-826 (2005 as Amended) provides as follows:
Attorney fees — Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees.
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or
other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of
the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least
one party to recover attorney fees.
Id.
Of course, the purpose of the section is to level the playing field by allowing
either party to recover fees when only one party may assert such a right under a
contract, remedying the unequal allocation of litigation risks built into many
contracts. In addition, this statute rectifies the inequitable common-law result in
18

which a party seeking to enforce a contract containing an attorney fees clause has a
significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to invalidate the contract.
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2007).
The Appellee makes an interesting argument regarding Defendants rights to
attorney fees. Appellee argues that since the Defendants claimed that they were
not liable to the Plaintiff under the terms of the Plaintiffs contracts, the
Defendants are precluded from requesting attorney fees based upon those same
contracts (Appellee's Brief at 16). Of course, the argument has no basis in the law.
Every case involving a contract containing an attorney fee provision is
accompanied by the claim of a party that it is not liable under the terms of the
contract. Contesting liability under a contract does not disqualify a party from
claiming the benefit of the attorney fee provision, as set for in the statute cited
above. SeeMyrah v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679 (UT App 2007).
Defendants submit that the contracts offered by the Plaintiffs provide for the
award of attorney fees and costs incurred in the enforcement thereof.

The

reciprocal attorney fee statute allows the Defendants to claim fees under that
contract. The Defendants are the successful or prevailing party having obtained
the default judgment. Finally, the entire litigation, including the issues on appeal,
stem from the Plaintiffs claims under the contract containing the attorney fee

19

clause. See Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 57- SPR, LLC, 144 P.3d 261, affd,
183 P.3d 248 (Utah 2006).
Defendants respectfully submit that they are entitled to the fees set out in the
affidavit filed with the district court and further are entitled to an award of fees
incurred after the filing of the affidavit, including fees and costs on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the total absence of any facts that would demonstrate a basis
under Rule 60(b), it is respectfully submitted that the trial court's Minute Entry of
February 4, 2009 should be reversed and the case remanded for assessment of fees
and costs at both the trial and appellate levels.
DATED this ^pjky

of July, 2009.

Sarah Hardy, Esq.
/
Attorney for Defendants/App&llants
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